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A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE CASE FOR A LOCUS STANDI RULE IN
PUBLIC LAW
The doctrine of locus standi, or standing, determines the competence of a
plaintiff to assert the matter of their complaint before the court.  Since an
individual lacking locus standi is an incompetent plaintiff,  it follows that, in
public law,  government can  exceed or abuse its powers with impunity
provided no such "qualified" litigant seeks the intervention of the court.  This
appears directly in conflict with the constitutional requirement of legality.
Public law is about imposing legal controls on governmental powers.  The
standing principle, which is probably feudal in origin, (1)   poses important
questions about the meaning of the rule of law  since the  courts appear
untroubled by excess or abuse of legal powers unless invited to intervene by an
individual having a cognisable interest in the matter.  (2)
The doctrine of standing limits the  access of  the citizen  to the court.  This
right of access is a key principle which has  been  embedded in the idea and
ethic of constitutional government since at least the Magna Carta. (3)     It is a
value which the courts are prepared implicitly to recognise and employ even if
to do so effectively entails  disobedience to a  statute.  (4)    But the weight
attached to this principle  appears to be contingent upon context: the general
rule that a citizen cannot approach the court to argue that government should
observe its own laws remains largely unquestioned. (5)
Moreover, judicial review is  only available where leave is obtained, and
remedies remain discretionary.  Thus locus standi rules in public law are a
component of a system which does not see the purpose of judicial review as the
control of administrative action per se: proof of illegality is by itself insufficient
and legality is subordinate to considerations of good administration,   the
perceived need to ration judicial resources and to exclude busybodies.  Yet the
requirement that government observe the law  must be a constitutional priority
which the courts should recognise unless principled reasons exist to justify  not
doing so.  This suggests that arguments used to justify locus standi should be
subjected to the closest scrutiny.     In this article my purpose is to explore these
arguments and I will suggest that in so far as standing continues to serve a
useful role this may be  fulfilled by the application of other, more precisely
focused, rules  already in existence which eliminate the need for a further layer
of exclusionary principles.  This discussion will also expose some concerns
2about the present  constitutional role of judicial review.   Before addressing
these issues it is important to note the constitutional context in which this
debate must take place.
Constitutional Fundamentals
Since the courts will refuse relief to an incompetent plaintiff even if unlawful
administrative action has occurred there appears to be a significant tension
between the doctrine of standing  and the   principle which ordains that
government  should be subject to the rule  of law.   Along with the supremacy
of Parliament, which requires courts to enforce all law duly enacted, the rule of
law   may be described as one of the twin bulwarks of the constitution. (6)
However, it is  not always clear  what is meant by this fundamental principle
which enshrines both a political as well as a legal doctrine.   It is proposed to
venture two possible interpretations of the latter (i.e. legal doctrine)  and then to
suggest that  neither fundamental demands a  doctrine of standing.  (7)
 According to orthodox constitutional theory, in the absence of a written
constitution, the validity of law is a question of form and not substance.   An
enacted law is enforced as such and  is recognised as having an authority which
requires neither the approval or disapproval of any governmental agency
obliged to act in accordance with its terms.  The English system  is a positivist
system.  Subject only to binding laws of the European Union, (8)   Parliament is
at liberty to enact any law.
A venerable and respected line of  authority from Entick v. Carrington (9)  to
such recent decisions as  R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p
Fire Brigades Union and ors (10)  and R v. Coventry City Council ex p Phoenix
Aviation (11) demonstrate that neither the administration  nor the courts can
refuse to apply a law simply because  the  rule at issue  is perceived to be
inconvenient or undesirable.  These principles mandate the courts to uphold
enacted law.  Embedded within this orthodoxy is a particular vision of  the rule
of law which  requires that  judges  respect legislation which is the outcome of
a democratic process.  This also recognises and, indeed, may require the
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty.   As will be seen below, the doctrine of
standing  exposes a fundamental difficulty that standing permits judges to
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violate an important  mandate of the rule of law  embracing the idea of
universality of law- that all are equally subject to legal rules.
An alternative interpretation of the rule of law  recognises that the rule of law
demands more than the enforcement of particular rules.  A non-democratic
legal system founded upon a denial of fundamental human rights could actually
conform  to the requirement of the rule of law in so far as the administration
could conduct itself properly in accordance with enacted law.  But this is only
so if the rule law is reduced  mere formalism.   It fails to recognise that  the rule
of law conveys qualitative ideas about the rules themselves and may demand
that only just law prevails.  Under our present system, however, an enacted law
need answer neither the demands of justice nor fairness.  The judges may wish
to avoid enforcing such an instrument by  invoking the idea of the rule of law
which could  permit the courts to identify fundamental constitutional values  as
more worthy of protection than the Diceyan idea that Parliament should be at
liberty to make or unmake any law. (12) This more radical interpretation of the
rule of law would therefore seek to place limits on Parliamentary Sovereignty.
The role and purpose of the standing doctrine is unaffected by this debate
because at the root of the dispute is one of  institutional demarcation  (whether
Parliament or the common law is supreme). The resolution of this institutional
conflict simply identifies which laws are capable of enforcement; the
circumstances in which enforcement is possible (the standing question) is a
separate issue.
What is significant is that locus standi undermines two essential elements of the
rule of law:  the ideas of universality of law and equality before the law. The
logic of the standing doctrine is that if there is no competent plaintiff
governmental bodies may  violate the legal limits of  their powers and the
courts are powerless to intervene.  It is thus inappropriate to describe the
constitution as furnishing limits  preventing the abuse of governmental power
since such limits are contingent and may ultimately prove to be delusory.
Amongst other rules, (13) standing thus places government in a uniquely
privileged constitutional position posing questions about  the extent to which
the British Constitution conforms to the requirement of universality of law and
thus  the  rule of law itself.
4(i)   Is the standing doctrine truly consistent with the doctrine of
Parliamentary sovereignty?
 Whilst Parliamentary approval for standing in judicial review may now have
been have been obtained following the enactment of s.31 of the Supreme Court
Act 1981  the origin of the doctrine lay in the common law.  Thus the courts are
open to the charge of having applied a  common law   rule in preference to
statutory  ones.  For example, if a local planning authority failed properly to
apply statutory limitations on the development of land, it could only be
compelled to do so by a person aggrieved. (14)  In the absence of such a person
stepping forward, the development might take place which Parliament had
intended to be controlled.  This raises acutely the question of judicial loyalty to
Parliament.
Moreover, the enactment of s.31 of the 1981 Act has not entirely addressed this
question.  Common law locus standi rules still control the circumstances in
which the citizen may seek a civil remedy to prevent the commission of a
statutory criminal offence or otherwise to enforce a statutory duty. (15)
But this does not conclude the issue.  Whilst the courts may have statutory
authority for applying locus standi rules in judicial review, Parliament may well
be concerned that the rules are so construed as to make some statutory regimes
effectively unenforceable in  particular factual contexts.  As Sir Konrad
Schiemann observed, (16)  rules which are enforceable are mere "delusions" .
It is this rather than the form in which the rules  operate that raises questions
about Parliamentary supremacy.  It surely cannot be presumed that Parliament
intended to have acted in vain.   Yet the Rose Theatre case suggests that there
might be cases in which no competent plaintiff might be found because the
Attorney-General would  take no action where the  decision impugned  is that
of a minister  and it is unlikely that a local authority could  effect a challenge
unless the subject matter concerned   the traditional jurisdiction of local
government bodies. (17)  Concerned members of the public   would presumably
share the same fate as the Trust Company in Rose Theatre.   (18)
(ii)  Standing is capable of producing arbitrary results lacking any coherence
in public law adjudication.
5 The following hypothetical examples  illustrate the point made above
concerning the  questionable legitimacy of giving priority to the doctrine of
standing rather than legislative regimes designed for the common good. They
also indicate that this produces arbitrary decisions which by themselves
demonstrate  a lack of   coherence in public law adjudication.
 Example 1  A local planning authority unlawfully disregards the development
plan for the area (19)   and  grants planning permission for  industrial
development in a residential area.  The purpose of  planning law is defeated.
The resulting development was not what Parliament intended should happen,
neither was it in the public interest.   (20)
If the court were asked to enforce the Town and Country Planning Act 1990
and quash the planning permission, it seems unsatisfactory if they should refuse
to do so  because the only citizen willing and financially able to invoke the
courts assistance is, let it be supposed,  a resident of a neighbouring town who
lacks locus standi (21)  
 Example 2.  The facts are as in example 1  but with the  difference that the
same public spirited individual was sufficiently affluent to have an interest two
properties, one of which was, by chance, sited in the neighbourhood affected.
This coincidence  would confer on him the necessary standing and  planning
law would be enforced.   (22)
These examples illustrate how the standing doctrine seems arbitrary in its
effects.  It is not   truly linked to any coherent theory of public law adjudication.
In public law terms the issues in each of these hypothetical cases would be
identical.  The central question in each would be the enforcement of planning
control, intended by Parliament to protect the community at large from
undesirable development.  If the planning authority exceeded its powers it
seems odd that the court could restrain it in one example but not the other. Yet
this is precisely the outcome.
Moreover, by virtue of the standing doctrine the important public interest would
depend entirely on the fortuity of having the "right" individual willing to take
proceedings. This did not occur in example 1 and so the public is forced to
endure development   precisely  of a kind which Parliament  enacted law to
6prevent.   It is this which raises questions about judicial loyalty to legislative
policy.
The reality is that the  distinction  between those two hypothetical cases is only
sustainable if public law is explained as a species of private law.   Public law is
enforced only to redress harm suffered by individuals; within its compass there
are more than faint echoes of corrective  justice.   This reflects a particular
model of adjudication which is considered further below. (23)  Yet this  model
of adjudication lays a misleading trail because it places the individual and not
the public at the heart of the system.  Public law provides a system of controls
on governmental power the beneficiaries of which are the community at large
and not one individual  even if that individual suffers more serious harm when
abuse of power  occurs.  Public duties were not constructed for his or her
benefit and  he or she is not to have a veto over their enforcement as if they
were private law rules. It is  undesirable that the court should be paralysed from
doing justice for the community on whose behalf  the law is enacted.
 (iii)    Standing, Democratic Principles and the Separation of Powers
Two arguments can be employed to suggest that standing is a consequence of
the separation of powers.  The first asserts that standing  ensures that the courts
adjudicate  individualised disputes; political questions  affecting the common
good   are properly a matter for the administration.    A similar argument
focuses on the question of  the enforcement of the laws.  This asserts that  the
community should be able to decide whether to enforce its own laws and that
this decision should reside with democratically accountable public bodies
rather than private individuals who are  ill-equipped either to identify or to
advocate the public interest.  These two issues will be considered in turn.
 Political Issues
The argument broadly stated is that standing doctrine is required to prevent the
court becoming lured into making political decisions.  If the doctrine were
absent, the  courts might find themselves  constrained to make policy decisions
which are properly a matter for elected government as opposed to an unelected
judiciary.  The standing doctrine is thus considered to reflect the court's
understanding of their role within a tripartite system of government.   (24)
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individual rights as opposed to policy questions affecting the common good or
public interest.  The idea of standing underpins this separation because it
ensures  the presence of a  disputed right or interest necessary to ensure that the
courts are determining an appropriately "narrow" individualised issue.  Gillick
v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority  (25)  is an oft cited
example of court  falling into this trap.  The objection is that because the
plaintiff's  standing was not self-evident the court found itself adjudicating the
public policy question of whether under age teenagers should receive
contraceptives. (26)
The perceived threat of political involvement can also be seen in the  Gouriet
case.     As the Secretary of a right wing organisation which probably had as
one of its  preferences  the curtailment of trade union power, Mr Gouriet was
not  merely an ordinary citizen.  The legal argument disguised what was in
effect a political confrontation concerning the role of unions, the law  and
government in industrial policy.  This policy was   based on abstentionism (27)
These matters were within a short space of time to become part of the agenda of
Conservative governments in the 1980's. (28)   It is not to difficult to
understand why courts might legitimately  hesitate to become involved in an
issue which might appear to begin implementing the agenda of  a particular
political party then in  opposition to that of  existing  Government policy and
contemporary labour law philosophy.
However, it may be possible to counter these arguments whilst recognising   the
need for judicial restraint.   A number of points can be made:
Law and Policy
The essence of the orthodox view based on the separation of powers is that it
assumes  a division between law and policy when these are  in reality
intertwined.  It ignores  many  decisions in which the courts, whilst determining
questions of law, have not shied from judgments which have in effect
substituted  judicial policy for that preferred by the policy maker without
transgressing their function of adjudication. Some might argue that it is
undesirable for the courts to go as far as they do, but it is possible to argue that
it is not an excess of   jurisdiction when they do.
8Although, of course, it is controversial, this judicial interventionism seems to be
possible even where the decision-maker is loyally implementing an electoral
mandate.  This shows that  the court is not deprived of its jurisdiction in a case
where  the  legal dispute involves a politically sensitive conflict  touching upon
the  mandate of an elected authority.  No clearer example of a "political"
decision could be found, yet the courts still intervene.   The doctrine of locus
standi  is not the ultimate shield against this happening, for political
consequences may still be far-reaching even if the standing rules are satisfied.
Bromley LBC v. GLC (29) is a pertinent  example of this  because local
government policies on transport were declared unlawful even though they
were supported by the  local electorate following an election in which the
commitment at issue was a manifesto pledge. (30)
 In Roberts v. Hopwood (31)  the House of Lords intervened to declare
unlawful a scheme for paying similar wage rates at levels above the market
average to  male and female workers alike notwithstanding that the local
authority had a statutory power to pay such wages as it thought fit. (32) This
decision unashamedly determined public sector wage rates, in particular those
for female workers.   This is a surprising decision because  the local
administration had won local support for its policies in improving wages for
workers precisely to address the inadequacy of paying market rates.   In Roberts
the House of Lords unhesitatingly intervened to condemn an electorally
supported programme of social reform.
 The effect of the decisions in these cases was to overturn the political choices
of democratically elected institutions acting in accordance with their election
promises. They are undoubtedly controversial decisions.  Questions may well
be asked as to whether the judges ought to have gone so far.  However, these
decisions did not take the courts beyond their jurisdiction. They unequivocally
demonstrate that  disputes about the legal limits of the powers of a public
authority  do not  become non-justiciable because of the possible impact on
either central or local government policy.  Where a  dispute arises about the
application of legal rules it is a justiciable matter regardless of the political
consequences which flow from the court's decision. Law and policy are thus
both at stake in such cases.    Thus it is important to distinguish between the
content of a determination ( whether there is a serious legal issue to be tried)
9and its consequences (whether or not involving issues of public choice).
Provided there is the requisite legal content in a dispute it is justiciable
regardless of its political consequences.  That requirement is satisfied by
evidence that the public body has abused its legal powers.  (33)
The Gouriet case plainly illustrates the point that the justiciability of a dispute
does not depend upon its political consequences.  Had Mr Gouriet  posted a
letter to a South African destination the case would have proceeded without any
question being raised about his competence as plaintiff.  Yet the political
consequences of the dispute would have been precisely the same as they were
absent the posting of a letter.    This surely demonstrates the essential fiction of
the standing doctrine; the presence or absence of  standing (in this case, the
expenditure of  a few pence on a stamp)  ought not by some magical process
convert a non-justiciable, political matter,  into a justiciable "legal" one or vice
versa.    It is the legal content of the claim -in Gouriet the question whether
anticipatory action could be taken to prevent a breach of the criminal law-which
prevents courts straying into the forbidden political arena.  It is this rather than
standing which preserves the idea of the separation of powers.
Should the Community have an exclusive power to enforce its own Laws?
The second argument was that the standing doctrine is necessary in order that
individuals can properly be excluded from enforcing the law unless a right or
interest of their own is at stake. This is  because  the community should be
responsible for choosing when and whether to enforce its own laws, and that
choice is to be made by publicly accountable officials.  This is said partly to
explain the principle that  not all breaches of the law need to be punished.  To
allow  individuals to seek to do so prevents a public choice about the
desirability of enforcing a law  in a particular factual context in which
punishment or other redress might be inappropriate.  (34)   This somewhat
paternalistic argument ignores the  undesirability of allowing the executive the
power to veto the enforcement of laws by which it is itself bound.  It also places
the responsibility for enforcing public duties in the hands of financially
constrained public authorities which may be forced to prioritise enforcement
action according to political choices  (e.g., Sunday trading)  The limited
effectiveness of institutional  mechanisms deserves separate notice beyond the
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scope of the present article. Suffice it to  state for present purposes that, apart
from  problems caused by under-resourcing, the system lacks comprehensive
scope so that important areas of administrative action may escape the net
altogether.
The principal responsibility for  enforcing a public duty lies with the Attorney-
General.   As a matter of practice, he never takes ex officio proceedings.  This
means the process remains reactive to individual complaint. Fundamentally, no
proceedings have ever been taken against central government which places
central government action beyond the scrutiny of the courts.   This is a serious
weakness in the institutional enforcement structure. Whilst theoretically
accountable to Parliament, the  Attorney-General's decisions, from which there
is no appeal, are beyond the scrutiny of the courts. (35)
Local authorities also have a power to enforce public duties but, despite the
ostensibly open textured nature of the statutory language designed to confer the
power, (36)  this competence has been judicially confined to matters within
local authority's traditional jurisdiction. Matters of general law enforcement
would be ultra vires (37)    Equally, local authorities are often  prevented by
budgetary, or political constraints from taking proceedings which are within
their jurisdiction.  This weakness  can be seen in the matter of illegal Sunday
trading.     Financial constraints rather than jurisdictional limitations  prevented
local authorities taking action against persistent and flagrant law-breakers even
though it was a matter which undoubtedly fell within their  legal competence.
(38)
In summary, the system is inadequate first because it is not comprehensive, and
secondly because its effectiveness where public bodies have a jurisdiction is
eroded by  under-resourcing.   These difficulties should themselves provide a
powerful argument for an actio popularis.
However, this does not conclude the issue because the concern is often
expressed that to permit an actio popularis is to allow a private individual to
decide which laws should be enforced.  The individual is not in a position to
decide whether justice is served by proceedings in a given factual context.
However, this  argument is also flawed because it fails to appreciate that access
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to court merely permits that individual   the opportunity to argue that the law
should be enforced.    It is for a court to decide the question.
The courts are adequately protected against  over-zealous litigants  in so far as
all public law remedies are discretionary;  and s.31 of the Supremem Court Act
1981 permits the court to refuse either leave or relief where the application is
detrimental to good administration.  This means that so the court could be
relied upon in an appropriate case to deny relief (or leave) where injustice
might result.   Standing is not a necessary protection in such cases.
(iv)   Does standing create a hierarchy of rights/ values?
There is a danger that standing treats  legal  regimes differently.  A violation of
some types of legal rights is more likely to result in an individual having
standing than others.  This is particularly so in relation to  "new values" (39)
These are new social, cultural, environmental   architectural  values  which do
not exist within the traditional conceptions of property rights.  They are
"shared" by the community at large and belong to no-one in particular.  As the
Rose Theatre case  demonstrates, standing rules make these new rights (or
claims) highly vulnerable despite their importance in modern society.
For example,  administrative action which unlawfully interferes with private
property rights will invariably allow the affected right-holder to challenge the
action concerned.  However, if the administrative action impugned has the
wider significance that it threatens the future of a species, it is much less certain
whether a concerned environmentalist will have standing to challenge the
decision.   (40)
 That this remains so seems surprising when the preservation of the richness
and variety of the natural environment, its flora and fauna, for future
generations seems a fundamental issue for humankind transcending the
importance of property rights of particular individuals; indeed it may not be
over dramatic to suggest that the future of our species is itself inextricably
linked to  the effectiveness of  enacted laws designed for environmental
protection.   Excluding concerned individuals in these  matters implies that the
courts are placing undue faith in institutional mechanisms to enforce these new
regulations.  This is a  breach of principle 10 of the Rio Declaration 1992
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which states that environmental issues are best handled with the participation of
all concerned citizens.  It further ordains that "effective access to judicial and
administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided".
(41) Given the importance of the issues at stake, any failure to harness the
commitment and zeal of environmentally aware individuals seems
unpardonably cautious.
(v)  Busybodies/vexatious challenges
The books are  replete with references to the need for standing to exclude
"busybodies". (42)   The rationale appears to be to exclude individuals who
seek to raise questions with which they are not properly concerned.  A closely
related argument emphasises the  need to protect public bodies from litigation
which is perceived as wasteful: public administration is not to be impeded or
delayed by wasteful challenges (43)    These two related issues will be
considered in turn.
(1)  Busybodies
The exclusion of so called "busybodies" creates three principle difficulties: (i)
the  indeterminacy of the busybody test; (ii) the manner in which it disguises
value judgements about the claim rather than about the individual applicant;
and (iii) the manner in which it confuses public law with private law
adjudication.
(a)  Indeterminacy
 It is quite impossible to identify a busybody with any clarity.    It would be a
straightforward matter if the  label  could simply be applied to any self
appointed  representative of a wider group of individuals, or any  advocate of
the public interest; but the judicial approach is more sophisticated. Self-
appointed representatives of the public have been held to have legitimately
nominated themselves to challenge the administration in matters which are not
their exclusive concern.   Mrs Whitehouse was a competent plaintiff to
challenge the  IBA on broadcasting standards (44)   as were Greenpeace and the
World Development Movement in respect of the environment ( 45)   and
overseas aid respectively (46) ; Mrs Gillick was also qualified to question the
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propriety of prescribing contraceptives to under-age children; (47)  and whilst
the National Federation of Self-employed and Small Businesses did not have
standing in the Fleet St Casuals case, (48)  it was held not to be a busybody
despite interfering in the tax affairs of third parties- an essentially private and
confidential matter which many would have regarded  as so much the exclusive
province of the taxpayer concerned that any third party interference would ex
hypothesi have been the interference of a "busybody".
(b)  Value judgments
In none of the above cases were the applicants more properly concerned about
the issues than other citizens but , as a matter of law, they were not busybodies.
This suggests that the "busbody" formula camouflages judicial distaste of the
merits rather than describing the  sufficiency of interest of the applicant.
If the court is prepared to recognise the application as raising issues which
deserve judicial resolution (49)  it may be tempted  not to probe too assiduously
the question whether the applicant satisfies traditional standing rules.     The
busybody  question is effectively marginalised or simply overlooked. (50)
(c)  The Problem of the Busybody Test  and Public Law Adjudication
The  doctrinal objection to the "busybody" approach is that it entails a search
for some legitimate "concern" in the applicant and this  implies that the   reason
for  the court's intervention is the protection of that interest of the applicant
qualifies the applicant as a competent plaintiff.    The resulting  emphasis upon
cognisable harm represents little more than a version of corrective justice in
which the court  prevents abuse of governmental power merely to address the
harm  it causes to an identifiable  individual.  A fully-fledged system of public
law is thus precluded by the busybody test.    The issue for public lawyers is
simply: has the body whose actions are impugned breached its public duty?  In
public law terms the "busybody" test is simply a distraction.
The  guiding criteria should  simply be (i) the  legal merits of the claim
asserted; and (ii) whether the applicant is capable of effectively advocating the
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issued raised (51)  The court has an inherent jurisdiction to strike out abusive
vexatious or frivolous claims,  so  a bona fide litigant with an arguable case
which is not vexatious, frivolous nor an abuse of the process ought not to be
denied standing if they can mount an effective challenge. (52)  Thus if the
function of standing is to exclude "busybodies" it can be seen as redundant; the
court has an inherent power to do so  and does not require a separate
exclusionary test.
 (2)  Standing as means of Protecting the Administration from Wasteful
Challenges
There is often  a conflict between two strands of the public interest.  In  tension
with the need to ensure that public bodies observe the legal limits of their
power is the separate public interest in the speedy implementation of policies
designed for the common good.  This is resolved by restricting access to court
to  individuals with a cognisable interest.  Thus cognisable harm caused to one
individual is seen as a sufficient reason to justify   delay in administration; but
the question raied by a concerned citizen as to whether administrative action is
actually lawful  is not because leave will normally be refused for want of
standing.   Thus judicially cognisable individual right/interests  trump the
majoritarian interest in being governed according to the law.
It is arguable that any delay or impediment to the implementation of policy
ought only to be tolerable for the sake of an overriding  public interest.    Whilst
it is true that the public has an interest in respecting private rights or interests, it
would be constitutionally more satisfying if the rationale of judicial
intervention were the vindication of the rule of law, rather than the benefit of a
particular individual.  In other words,  delayed implementation of policy would
be tolerable because of a public interest in requiring government to observe its
own laws.
But this is not the end of the matter because at least one member of the
judiciary has seen the rationale of standing as a means of  preventing  the
"administrative chaos" which might arise  if an actio popularis  were permitted.
(53)  This, he suggested, was the reason why the law is prepared to treat
admittedly unlawful administrative action as lawful. (54)  This  explanation of
the purpose of standing is, however, unsatisfying because    s.31 of the Supreme
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Court Act 1981 provides rigorous procedural protection against wasteful,
delayed or otherwise harmful claims.  The court has a power to refuse either
leave or a remedy  if the claim which is, for example, detrimental to good
administration, or which would cause substantial hardship.   These procedural
rules remove any similar purported justification for the standing doctrine. (55)
(vi)   Inundation
A  further  argument often made for standing rules is  ancient in origin.  It sees
the  purpose of standing either as a means of permitting the judges to manage
the business of the courts or, alternatively, as a different expression of the
previously mentioned judicial perception of a demarcation of responsibility
between the courts, the executive and Parliament.
The argument asserts that if any individual can bring proceedings to enforce a
public duty  it is literally open to everyone to do so.   As was  observed  in
Iveson v. Moore (56) "if one man may have an action, for the same reason a
hundred thousand may"  and the courts would be flooded with claims.  The
restriction of standing to those with an interest over an above that of the
community at large restricts the flow of potential claims.
It is possible to dismiss this argument quite briefly:
(i)  multiple claims over one issue can be joined as a single claim and heard
together ; (57)
(ii)  If the above is inappropriate, the hearing of the first case concerning the
legality of administrative action is  normally sufficient to  offer redress to all.
If the policy or decision is upheld the doubt about its legality is resolved for all
those affected by it.   To permit no-one to claim is simply to allow  possible
illegality to continue .
(iii)  There is little likelihood in modern times that the courts will be swamped.
The cost of proceedings effectively prohibits the private citizen from enforcing
the public interest.  As Rabelais wrote: "Misery is the companion of the law
suit".  (58)   It was judicially recognised as long ago as Smith v. Wilson  (59)
that risk of inundation had long ceased to be a credible reason for the
application of standing rules.
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The concern of the judges in modern times is to assert some managerial control
over access to the court to conserve precious judicial resources. (60)   However,
the abolition of the standing rules would not create a right of access to court
since the  consequence of the leave stage is that access to court  would still be a
matter of judicial discretion. It is the leave stage which (along with other
provisions already mentioned) already provides the necessary filter against
inundation and wasteful claims or those which would be detrimental to the
administration or cause substantial hardship.  Locus standi is redundant in these
terms. (61)
(vii)  The Citizens' Action
 A Novelty?
Precedents suggest that the introduction of an actio popularis would not be the
radical reform which it may otherwise appear.   These precedents reveal that the
judges have long been prepared either to stretch the standing rules to  allow
access to a particular applicant whom it is thought ought to be granted a
remedy, or even to depart from the standing requirement altogether.  This is a
surprisingly well-rooted line of authority, not confined to judicial review cases,
suggesting that locus standi is sometimes more deeply coloured by the
perceived importance of the issue raised than sufficiency of the interest of the
applicant.  The applicant is more likely to succeed, of course, if a sufficient
interest can be established, but it does not follow that where the absence of an
interest will mean that dismissal of the application  Public interest
considerations may readily tip the scales in the applicant's favour.   The
problem is to identify when this will be so.   There is an ad hoc approach to
this issue and the case law reveals some bewildering indeterminacy. (62)   It is
not possible here to provide an exhaustive analysis of the relevant decisions but
the following non-exhaustive list is offered. (63) The form in which the
proceedings are brought can also be influential to the standing question.  An
experiment in varying   locus standi requirements where representative
proceedings are concerned may sometimes permit class representatives  to
sustain a claim in which they are not personally interested.  In  Ellis v. Duke of
Bedford (64) five named plaintiffs (market traders) representing market traders
and others  were allowed to plead that the market owner had breached certain
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duties in operating the market, but the statement of claim included  matters in
which none of the representatives had an interest.  Lord Macnaghten said:
"If the persons named as plaintiffs are members of a class having a common
interest, and if the alleged rights of the class are being denied or ignored, it
does not matter in the least that the nominal plaintiffs have been wronged or
inconvenienced in their individual capacity.  They are none the better for that
and none the worse.  They would be competent representatives if they had
never been near the Duke (the market owner)."
 According to one possible interpretation of the decision, the sharing of a
common interest in the market with those whom they represented justified the
court in waiving the requirement that they assert a private right of their own.
(65)   But Lord Macnaghten appears to have gone further than this by
suggesting that the representatives would have been competent representatives
if they had never been near the Duke, in other words if they were not even
traders in the market.  This  implies  that  a public spirited litigant might be a
competent plaintiff in representative proceedings.  The implications for
standing are self-evident.
 However, before any further conclusion can be drawn about the abandonment
of the standing doctrine there remains to consider some cogent objections to the
actio popularis.
Surrogate claims
An important argument is raised by Craig (66) citing the work of the US writer
Jaffe who argues that an actio popularis would be detrimental because it would
permit  one citizen to assert rights belonging to another.   This is the most
cogent of all arguments  for a  doctrine  of standing.   Craig   asserts  that
standing should be awarded, in the discretion of the court,  to any citizen unless
it was evident from the statutory framework that the range of persons  having
standing is restricted, in which case only those falling in the protected class
would have be able to seek judicial review. (67)  The Law Commission in its
report on Judicial Review and Statutory Appeals (68)  favoured a  test which
would allow those adversely affected  to have standing to seek judicial review
whilst others would be allowed to do so where it is in the public interest for the
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application to proceed. (69)  The reason for this latter kind of twin track test,
according to Jaffe, is that there may be cases in which the interests which the
law seeks to protect are narrowly defined and the individuals enjoying those
interests are content with the unlawful administrative action that has taken
place.   He gives the example of a restaurant sited in a place in which it ought
not to be.  He doubts whether,  if  neighbours and local residents are content
with this,  a stranger, perhaps from a  different area of town, should be able to
complain  (70)
Craig agrees with this reasoning but offers a more powerful example of the
problem. (71)     He asks if the Chief Constable dismissed for poor leadership in
Ridge v. Baldwin (72) had decided not to challenge his ultra-vires dismissal,
and thus to forgo his pension, why should any one else have been able to
interfere?  It was a matter exclusively for the Chief Constable and could not
properly have been the concern of any other individual.
Because an actio popularis would appear to permit  claims  by third parties in
such cases,  Craig seems to regard the Ridge v. Baldwin problem as sufficient to
justify some form of standing doctrine, however it may be formulated.  This
means that  a case for the abolition of standing  must meet  the kind of problem
posed by such cases as  Ridge v. Baldwin.
The Ridge v. Baldwin problem
First it will be argued that there are circumstances in which claims by third
parties are already  permissible.  This will demonstrate that  Ridge v. Baldwin
is  not of such a general application as to suggest an absolute bar on all claims
by third parties.
Secondly,   Ridge v. Baldwin  can be seen as a "hybrid" case in involving
elements of both public and private law in which private law issues
predominated.  The decision is  not one upon which  general conclusions about
standing in public law matters ought to be drawn.
Exceptions to the general locus standi rule where third party claims  are
possible
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Although  the orthodox position is that third parties should not be allowed to
advocate the rights of others, (73)   both English and United States jurisdictions
have  been prepared not to apply the general rule where its underlying rationale
is absent.
(i)  Associational Standing (74)
There are circumstances in which an association is entitled to bring proceedings
on behalf of its members.  This is so in the United States where   (i) its
members would otherwise  themselves have standing to sue; (ii) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organisation's purpose; (iii) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the law suit. (75)
A similar rule applies in English Law. In R v. Chief Adjudication Officer ex p
Bland (76) where advice given by Chief Adjudication Officer to his officials
that they should deduct a specified sum from the amount of supplementary
benefit payable to a married couple where one them was on strike was
successfully challenged in an application brought by  three plaintiffs: the
Trades Union Congress, the National Union of Mineworkers and a   striking
miner claiming benefit.  The Court held that the miner had locus standi since
his entitlement to benefit might be prejudiced by the change; the NUM had
standing because it stood in a relationship of proximity with the miners. Acting
under its rules it  had called the strike which had lead to the changes; but  TUC
lacked locus standi because it was too remote from the issue.  (77)
(ii)  Non-Associational Standing
In both United States and English law there are circumstances in which
individuals without a cognisable interest of their own are permitted to assert
claims which might otherwise be brought by others. In the United States a line
of authority begun in Singleton v. Wulff  (78) permits third party  to litigate the
rights of others  where the third party is fully as effective an advocate of the
right as the right holder himself, provided also there  is some  impediment
which  might inhibit the case being brought by the individual/s affected. (83)
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In  this case it was accepted that  there were problems for the women in
reconciling the publicity of litigation in asserting the right to abortion with
concerns for their individual privacy.    (79)
The possibility of third party claims is not restricted to the United States.  In  re
S  (81) the Court of Appeal held that  a woman was able to prevent a wife and
son removing her incapacitated co-habitee (a Norwegian) from the jurisdiction
for treatment in Norway against his presumed wishes notwithstanding that at
first instance the judge had held that in order to seek a declaration the plaintiff's
own legal position should be resolved by the intervention of the court. (82)
  Sir Thomas Bingham with whom all agreed stated
"It cannot of course be suggested
 that any stranger or officious busybody, however remotely connected with a
 patient or with the subject matter of proceedings, can properly seek or
 obtain declaratory or any other relief (in private law any more than public
 law proceedings).  But it can be suggested that where a serious justiciable
 issue is brought before the court by a party with a genuine and legitimate
 interest in obtaining a decision against an adverse party the court will
 not impose nice tests to determine the precise legal standing of that
 claimant."  (83)
The decision may perhaps be explained by virtue of the close relationship
which existed between the  plaintiff and the incapacitated patient which gave
her an interest in  having the location of his care determined.
A very different and important case was that reported in the Times (84) in
which  the intervention of strangers was legitimate.  Here anti-abortion
campaigners won an injunction to restrain abortion of one of  a healthy pair of
twins.   This decision throws into doubt the point made by Craig about the
Ridge v. Baldwin problem.  (85)   In the abortion case, just as in Ridge v.
Baldwin, it could be argued that the matter at issue was a private one which
could not be the legitimate concern of third parties or strangers. Alternatively, it
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might have been objected that the only third party qualified to intervene for the
sake of the unborn child would be the Official Solicitor.  (86)   Neither of these
possible objections seems to have prevailed.   Third parties were thus permitted
to intervene in a matter which  might be regarded as a a confidential one
between doctor and patient in which only the State should interfere in its parens
patriae role. This suggests that the courts are not particularly  impeded by the
Ridge v. Baldwin problem  from intervening in an issue  of privacy  where the
public interest requires  such considerations to be overridden.   It is interesting
that the court permitted a pressure group, rather than the Official Solicitor, to
argue that this was so.
It is likely that the courts are still evolving the circumstances in which a third
party  claim is possible.   At present the only limitation appears to be that the
plaintiff should not be a "busybody", (87)  although the scope and effect of this
limitation must be uncertain after the abortion case.
The public/private law divide
But this does not conclude the issue.  It would be inappropriate to draw general
conclusions about standing  from Ridge v. Baldwin - a case in which private
law issues, namely the alleged wrongful dismissal, predominated.   After
McLaren v. Home Office (88)  judicial review is normally not available to
employees seeking to assert a personal claim against their employer for
damages for breach of contract or  wrongful dismissal, or even a declaration or
injunction.   The facts of  Ridge v. Baldwin  would have made the case
inappropriate for judicial review.    As this case could not now be a matter
falling  within the purview of the judicial review procedure,  the future of
standing in public law claims should not be resolved by drawing general
conclusions from this decision.
Conclusion
The constitutional priority that government observe the law  should require
courts to enforce the law whenever the court is properly seised of proceedings
which establish that the administration has disregarded  the law, because  all
citizens have an interest in being governed according to the law.    There should
be no departure from this principle unless there is a  rational and overriding
public interest to be served by  withholding access to court. There may, of
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course, be instances in which allowing a case to proceed is detrimental to the
administration, but the court already enjoys the extensive protection of
procedural rules either to deny leave altogether or refuse a remedy.    Thus  it
has been argued that  the  reasons for the standing doctrine  which supply a
sufficient  justification for refusing to enforce the law can adequately be
satisfied by  resort to procedural rules which have a function which makes
standing redundant. No other reason advanced for the standing doctrine in
public law is ultimately  convincing.   The courts should  recognise that in
public law a bona fide litigant with an arguable case which is not vexatious,
frivolous nor an abuse of the process of the court ought not to be  denied
standing if they  are sufficiently informed to mount an effective challenge
within an adversarial system.
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